Induction and Miracles

Unlike the school papers I had posted here before anyone ever read the blog, I felt this was bloggish enough to be blogworthy. I hope you enjoy. The inductive principle states that future experiences will resemble past experiences. This allows us to make general and specific inductive inferences. (This is not as difficult to understand as it sounds.) For example, since my past experience tells me that eggs are nourishing but gravel is not, in the future I will eat eggs for breakfast instead of gravel. The reason I have for doing this is that I believe future experiences will resemble past experiences. Now, the future will obviously not always be exactly like the past. No one is claiming that. The claim is only that the future will resemble the past. So, given my past experience, future experiences that are like my past experiences will be very similar. The future will resemble the past. There may even be surprises along the way. For example, the eggs could have gone bad. This still does not overturn our belief that the future will resemble the past. In fact, if we know that the eggs have gone bad, we infer, based on past experience, that they will not nourish, will taste bad, etc. if the eggs taste bad or make us sick, we may infer, based on past experience, that the eggs have gone bad. These are inferences based on the inductive principle, not instances where the inductive principle is somehow refuted. There is a reason why this is important. Some question the ability of Christians to use the inductive principle because of miracles. There have been several different answers to this problem and some deep theological considerations with respect to the Reformed understanding of miracles, but I think the best answer to the question can be readily found in the writings of the great philosopher, skeptic, and atheist Bertrand Russell. Russell devotes a significant portion of his Problems of Philosophy to the subject of the "problem of induction".

The problem of induction is stated quite clearly by Russell.

"All arguments which, on the basis of experience, argue as to the future or the unexperienced parts of the past or present, assume the inductive principle; hence we can never use experience to prove the inductive principle without begging the question. Thus we must either accept the inductive principle on the ground of its intrinsic evidence, or forgo all justification of our expectations about the future." (Russell, Problems of Philosophy, pg. 310)

This puts us in quite a predicament. All inferences concerning matters of fact are undercut by this problem. The Christian argues, however, that since the universe is constantly subject to order by the will of our infinite-personal God, we have every reason to believe that future experiences will resemble past experiences.

The unbeliever will undoubtedly ask, "What about miracles?". This is really missing the point though, for it does not solve the unbeliever's problem of being unable to justify any inductive inferences. Once one realizes the indefinite number of practical facets of our lives which are based upon the inductive principle as well as the entirety of science itself one realizes what a massive problem this is. The unbeliever's worldview simply cannot make sense of anything.

The objection about miracles is easily solved. Russell took care of this when he wrote:

"The fact, therefore, that things often fail to fulfil our expectations is no evidence that our expectations will not probably be fulfilled in a given case or a given class of cases. Thus our inductive principle is at any rate not capable of being disproved by an appeal to experience." (Russell, Problems of Philosophy, pgs. 309-310)

Miracles are not a threat to the inductive principle. They fall into the same category as the bad eggs. No appeal to miracles may be seen as refuting the principle of induction, for we are looking for reason to think that things will probably be such-and-such based upon past experience and the belief that the future will resemble the past. As Christians, we humbly suggest that miracles are to be expected in accordance with the will of God as it is seen to operate throughout Scripture, but we certainly do not expect these to be so frequent and of such an arbitrary nature that we have no reason to believe that the future will be like the past. Instead, the nature of God as it is revealed to us is our very basis for making such an assumption about the future resembling the past. As Russell states, an appeal to experience cannot refute this belief.

"The inductive principle, however, is equally incapable of being proved by an appeal to experience. Experience might conceivably confirm the inductive principle as regards the cases that have been already examined; but as regards unexamined cases, it is the inductive principle alone that can justify any inference from what has been examined to what has not been examined." (Russell, Problems of Philosophy, pgs. 309-310)